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second degree felony? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 58-37-8(1) and (2) as amended. 
See Appendix A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Appellant was charged with distribution of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony. The matter was filed 
before the Second District Court, in and for Davis County. A 
change of venue was sought and granted, venue b€>.ing changed to 
Judge Pat Brian, Third District Court, in and for Salt Lake County. 
The case was set for trial on February 6, 1989. Prior to that 
time, Defendant-Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence and 
properly noticed that Motion for hearing on January 20, 1989. See 
Appendix B. This Motion to Suppress was thereafter continued by 
the Court's own motion until February 6, 1989, immediately prior 
to the beginning of trial. This Motion to Suppress was denied by 
the Court, a jury selected and trial begun on February 6, 1989. 
The trial lasted for three days ending on February 8, 1989 with a 
jury verdict finding the Defendant-Appellant guilty of a second 
degree felony, distributing a controlled substance. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Davis Metro Narcotics Task Force was conducting a series of 
controlled buys from Kevin and Kathy Gartrell, through the use of 
a confidential informant. Record at 19-32, 35-44. Pursuant to 
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surveillance of Kathy Gartrell during a controlled buy on March 30, 
1988 with said informant, she was followed to a West Valley City 
neighborhood from her home in Farmington. Record at 47, 133-135. 
As Kathy Gartrell pulled into this West Valley City 
neighborhood, Officer Rapp, who was following her, drove past the 
neighborhood so as not to raise suspicions. Record at 135. In the 
meantime, Officer Brian, who had lost observation, was attempting 
to catch up to the suspect. When Officer Brian arrived at the West 
Valley City neighborhood, it had been several minutes since the 
suspect had last been observed. Officer Brian first noticed the 
suspect's car parked in front of a duplex. Record at 48. He drove 
past the duplex, down the street and into the driveway of a vacant 
house so as to inconspicuously observe the duplex. Record at 49. 
During this period of time, which was about 20 minutes, Officer 
Brian noticed at least three different vehicles come and go from 
the duplex, however, he was not able to identify any of those 
people nor did he see which side of the duplex they entered. 
Because of this poor vantage spot, Officer Brian changed locations 
to directly east of the duplex so that he could better observe the 
front of the duplex. Record at 49. 
Thereafter, Kathy Gartrell exited the duplex and proceeded to 
return to her home in Farmington, presumably to meet the informant 
and complete the drug transaction. Record at 53. At no time 
during this observation, did any of those officers involved observe 
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Defendant-Appellant at the premises* Record at 76. 
Officer Rapp followed the suspect the entire way back to 
Farmington, where she pulled into her driveway, entered her home, 
returned to the vehicle and obviously noticed his surveillance. 
Officer Rapp, upon being noticed by the suspect, drove off and did 
not see her again until she was arrested at the Centerville off-
ramp. This gap in surveillance was at least five to ten minutes, 
if not longer. Record at 153-155. In fact, the only other 
information as to Kathy Gartrell's whereabouts is from Les Dowdle, 
who testified that as she drove away from her home, it appeared 
that she had gone into the municipal parking lot, although he was 
not sure that she had. Record at 198. 
At the time of her arrest, Kathy Gartrell was found to possess 
a controlled substance and triple-beam scales. Record at 55-56, 
155-156. 
Based on these events, Officer Brian sought a search warrant 
on the West Valley City duplex at 3216 South 2050 West. Record at 
57. In his affidavit for a search warrant, (See Appendix C) , 
Officer Brian failed to mention significant gaps in the 
surveillance of the suspect, as well as many intervening situations 
which leave much doubt as to where, and between whom, illegal 
activity took place (i.e., the gap in surveillance when suspect 
entered the West Valley City neighborhood, the large gap in 
surveillance when she observed Officer Rapp following her, and the 
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entry and exit of at least three (3) other persons into the duplex 
during the time suspect was there.) Record at 76-77. 
The search warrant was issued by Layton Circuit Court Judge 
Taylor. See Appendix D. It was executed on 3216 South 2040 West, 
West Valley City on the evening of March 30, 1989. A large number 
of items were seized, including currency, paraphernalia, a drivers 
license, and utility bills. Record at 140, 142, 144, 147, 148, 
158, 160. In fact, utility bills, as seized, show at least one 
other male, and possibly a female as sharing occupancy of that 
duplex with Defendant-Appellant. Record at 160. 
Based on these above events, Defendant-Appellant was charged 
with distribution of a controlled substance. He reasonably sought 
hearing on a Motion to Suppress on January 20, 1989. See Appendix 
B. This was continued for hearing until February 6, 1989. See 
Transcript of Motion to Suppress title page. That hearing was 
rapidly pushed so the jury trial could begin. Transcript of Motion 
to Suppress at 58, 198, 117, 122. 
The jury trial was held. At that trial additional evidence 
was entered before the trier-of-fact. Evidence, in the form of a 
photograph, was entered to show the obvious street sign "2040 West" 
immediately in front of the actual premises searched. Record at 
84. (Photograph is Defendants Exhibit D.) 
Also at trial, alleged eyewitness testimony of the course of 
events within the duplex while Kathy Gartrell was there, show that 
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no exchange was made, that no drugs were given to Kathy Gartrell. 
Record at 122. Despite evidence of a circumstantial nature only, 
Defendant-Appellant was convicted of distribution of a controlled 
substance, a second degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1* The trial court's continuance of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress substantially impaired preparation of defense at trial. 
The strategy of defense initially was to determine the Court's 
stance with regards to admissibility of evidence seized pursuant 
to a search warrant. In so determining this stance, defense 
counsel at trial made every reasonable effort to have the Motion 
to Suppress heard more than two weeks before trial. Because of the 
continuance, Defendant-Appellant was denied opportunity to 
adequately prepare defense against much of the evidence. Also, the 
Court impaired its own objectivity by forcing the hearing 
immediately prior to a jury trial. By virtue of the fact that a 
jury panel had been called, and was waiting, the Court became more 
worried about seeing a jury selected than about the rights of 
Defendant-Appellant. 
2. Statements made by the Affiant in the affidavit for search 
warrant were shown to be false in both the hearing on the Motion 
to Suppress and at trial. Such statements when r€>.moved from the 
affidavit, or reformed to fit the actual observations of the 
Affiant clearly show that there was no conclusion of probable cause 
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upon which a search warrant could be issued upon the duplex. This 
lack of probable cause arises from gaps in surveillance, as well 
as the observation of many intervening people and opportunities 
wherein drug transactions could reasonably have taken place. 
3, The address actually searched, wherein circumstantial 
evidence was obtained with regards to Defendant-Appellant was not 
the residence upon which a search was authorized. All documents 
supporting the search warrant, and including the search warrant 
stated the address of 3216 or 3218 South 2050 West. From evidence 
seized at the actual premises searched, the search was conducted 
upon 3216 South 2040 West. Where this incorrect address, 
specifically 2040 West versus 2050 West, is not a typographical 
error, it casts a question of credibility upon the Affiant seeking 
search warrant as to his reliability in observation, thus also 
casting doubt as to probable cause for the search warrant. 
4. Evidence produced at the trial of this matter did not show 
any transaction or distribution of a controlled substance. At 
most, testimony showed a simple possession of contraband or 
paraphernalia; at least, the evidence did not even show the 
necessary nexus of control or dominion by Defendant-Appellant over 
such contraband sufficient to even convict of a third degree 
felony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
CONTINUING, ON ITS OWN MOTION, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT•S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS TO THE SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT OF 
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DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AT TRIAL* 
The Trial Court continued Defendant-Appellant's Motion to 
Suppress, by its own motion, from January 20, 1989 to the morning 
immediately preceding Defendant-Appellantfs trial on February 6, 
1989. The issue herein is, whether such continuance by the Trial 
Court is an abuse of its discretion which substantially harmed 
Defendant-Appellant at trial? It is. See, State v. Creviston, 646 
P.2d 750 (Utah 1982). 
Matters of the continuance, when claimed ais error at the 
appellate level, usually involve claims of the* Trial Court's 
failure to grant a continuance which in some way deprives the 
Defendant in his preparation for trial. In this instance, the 
appellate court is asked to view the Trial Court's continuance, 
upon its own motion, as a substantial deprivation of Defendant-
Appellant in preparation for his trial. 
Whether or not to continue a hearing or trial is a matter of 
Trial Court discretion. Existent case law is unified on the point 
that this discretion of Trial Court is to be given wide berth by 
the appellate review and "will not be reversed...absent a clear 
abuse of that discretion." Crevistonf at 752 (quoting, State v 
Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093 (Utah 1975)). Creviston, goes on to say 
that "[a]buse may be found where a party has made timely 
objections, given necessary notice, and made reasonable effort to 
have the trial date reset for good cause, Id at 752, (quoting 
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Griffiths v. Hammon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977)). 
Defendant-Appellant contends that since he had made reasonable 
effort to set the hearing on his Motion to Suppress significantly 
in advance of the time set for trial, he had thereby, in good 
faith, attempted to obtain a ruling from the Trial Court with 
regards to admissibility of the Statefs evidence against him. He 
had done this to protect valuable time to adequately and 
sufficiently prepare for his trial based on the evidence he could 
then reasonably suspect to be produced at trial. The Trial Court, 
by use of its authority, then continued the hearing on Defendant-
Appellant's Motion to Suppress which effectively denied Defendant-
Appellant adequate preparation time for trial. This denial, by 
court action, was an abuse of the Trial Court's discretion, which 
substantially impaired Defendant-Appellant's defense preparation, 
forcing him immediately to proceed to trial to contend with 
evidence he had otherwise believed was inadmissible, and which he 
would not need to counteract. 
This differs significantly from a case where the trial court 
may hear the Motion to Suppress but reserve ruling until time of 
trial. The difference being that defense counsel at trial would 
have a strong indication of the trial court's concerns about the 
evidence at question. Knowing the court's concerns, said defense 
counsel could then more adequately prepare to deal with the 
evidence at time of trial. For this very purpose, of having an 
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indication of what evidentiary concerns would arise at trial, 
defense counsel made every reasonable effort to have the Motion to 
Suppress heard well in advance of trial in this matter. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court impaired its own objectivity by 
continuing the Motion to Suppress to a time immediately before 
trial. Because a jury panel had already been called, the Court was 
under self-imposed pressure to allow all evidence to stand as valid 
under the search warrant and admissible, then allowing the jury to 
attach weight and credibility as such evidence Wcis brought before 
the trial. Such action by the Court effectively undermined the 
rules of evidence wherein the judge is, in fact, to decide issues 
of validity and admissibility of evidence. The Court should not 
let factors of weight and credibility as might appear before the 
jury affect its determination. Such evidence as is invalidly 
obtained and inadmissible should never reach the jury. 
II. FALSE STATEMENTS BY AFFIANT IN THE AFFIDAVIT 
FOR SEARCH WARRANT, WHEN EXCISED FROM THE AFFIDAVIT, 
LEAVE NO BASIS FOR FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE UPON WHICH A 
SEARCH WARRANT CAN BE GRANTED. 
Circuit Court Judge Taylor, in reliance upon an Affidavit of 
Officer Lon Brian, which affidavit contained* materially false 
statements, issued a search warrant on a duplex in West Valley 
City. The basic question herein is, whether probable cause for 
issuance of the search warrant existed, once materially false 
statements were excised from that Affidavit? It did not. See 
State v. Dorsey. 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1986); State v. Nielson. 727 
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P.2d 188 (Utah 1986); See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 
(Utah 1987)? State v. Miller. 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987). 
Amendment IV to the Constitution of the United States sets 
forth the fundamental right that people are to be free of 
unreasonable search and seizure, and that a warrant for any such 
search and seizure is to be based upon probable cause. Article* I, 
Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah also sets forth this right 
as a matter of state law. Yet, the question still remains, what 
constitutes probable cause? In State v. Dorsev, the Utah State 
Supreme Court followed the United States Supreme Court in holding 
that "[p]robable cause exists where the facts and circumstances 
within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had 
reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves 
to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an 
offense has been or is being committed." 731 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 
1986), (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 
69 SCt. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L.Ed 1879 (1949)). Further, in quoting 
Brinegar, at 176, 69 SCt. at 1311, the Utah Supreme Court, in 
Dorsey. at 1088, delineated mere suspicion from probable cause. 
"The line between mere suspicion and probable cause...necessarily 
must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in light of a particular 
situation and with account taken of all circumstances." 
In accord, Utah case law now resoundingly holds that the 
sufficiency of affidavits for search warrant as to establishing 
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probable cause upon which to issue a search warrant is based upon 
a "totality-of-the-circumstances" test. See, e.g., State v. 
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). 
As part of that totality of circumstances test, relevant Utah 
case law further holds that where false statements are found in the 
Affidavit for a Search Warrant, such statements are to be excised, 
then the remaining information in the affidavit is to be reviewed 
to determine if the remaining information establishes probable 
cause. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987). 
Upon review, if the affidavit, with false statements excised, fails 
to support the previous finding of probable cause, then any 
evidence obtained under the improperly issued warrant must be 
suppressed. State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986). 
In the instant case, two key statements in the Affidavit for 
the Search Warrant, upon which probable cause was established in 
issuing the search warrant are false. The first false statement 
is found at paragraph 8 of the affidavit. See Appendix C. Therein 
Affiant states that he observed the suspect the entire time, from 
the suspect's own residence in Farmington to the West Valley City 
duplex. In fact, the Affiant's trial testimony was that the 
suspect's vehicle was not under surveillance for several minutes 
upon entering the neighborhood in West Valley, and that no one 
observed the suspect leave her car, nor did any one observe which 
residence she entered, of many possible choices, upon arrival in 
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that neighborhood. 
The suspect referred to is Kathy Gartrell, Defendant-
Appellant's sister-in-law. It was suspected that she purchased a 
controlled substance from someone at the residence in West Valley 
City. However, with intervening lapses in surveillance, coupled 
with Officer Brian fs testimony that many people came and went while 
Mrs. Gartrell was in the duplex residence area, there is nothing 
more than mere suspicions that she purchased from a resident of the 
duplex. A man of reasonable caution would not be able to conclude 
that a resident of that duplex was the supplier, rather the comings 
and goings of several people, destroys any assuredness inasmuch as 
any of such people could have arrived at the duplex with a 
controlled substance and made an exchange with Mrs. Gartrell. 
The second, and equally significant, false statement was that 
found in paragraph 15 of the Affidavit for Search Warrant. See 
Appendix C The content of the affidavit statement, attributed to 
Officer Paul Rapp, was that he observed the suspect leave her home, 
go to a parking lot for a short while, then enter southbound 1-15 
traffic. Officer Rapp's sworn testimony differed greatly. He 
testified that his surveillance had been spotted by the suspect as 
she stood in the driveway to her home in Farmington upon her 
arrival there from West Valley City. Upon being so noticed, 
Officer Rapp drove off and did not see suspect for five to ten 
minutes or even longer, until the time when suspect was apprehended 
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on the Centerville off-ramp. In fact, during this period of time, 
suspect was not under surveillance at all by task force officers. 
These two gaps in surveillance, coupled with the blatant fact 
that no one knew whether or not the suspect originally carried the 
drugs from her own residence in the first place, ccist considerable 
doubt upon any imagined probable cause that the drugs were bought 
by the suspect from someone at the residence alleged to be the 
residence as occupied by Defendant-Appellant. Once these false 
statements are removed from the affidavit for a search warrant, and 
once omitted statements of actual observation are put into the 
affidavit for search warrant, the affidavit fails to be sufficient 
upon which to base a finding of probable cause for the issuance of 
the search warrant. Such being the case, nearly all circumstantial 
evidence mustered to tie Defendant-Appellant to the duplex and as 
used to convict Defendant-Appellant of the underlying charge is 
tainted by the improperly issued warrant, and should have been 
suppressed prior to trial. 
III. THE SEARCH AT ADDRESS 3216 OR 3218 SOUTH 2040 
WEST WAS AN ILLEGAL SEARCH IN THAT ALL DOCUMENTS 
AUTHORIZING A SEARCH DID SO FOR ADDRESS 3216 OR 3218 
SOUTH 2050 WEST. 
The Affidavit for Search Warrant and the Search Warrant 
itself, both clearly specify and authorize search on the address 
of 3216 or 3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City. The address 
which was actually searched in this matter was 3216 South 2040 West 
in West Valley City. The issue here is, where the address upon 
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which a search warrant is sought and issued is not typographically 
in error, yet the actual premises searched is of a different 
address, is the actual search illegal? It is. Cf. State v. Kelly, 
718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986). 
Utah case law generally allows the validity of searches to 
stand where incorrect street numbers are given in the affidavit or 
on the face of the search warrant. Usually validity is maintained 
because the incorrect numbers have arisen from typographical error 
and the correct address is found in some of the supporting 
documents. In Kelly, 718 P.2d at 392, the warrant specified an 
incorrect street number. The Utah Supreme Court overlooked this 
error in the warrant because the correct address appeared in the 
attached affidavit. That Court then went on to say, "considering 
that the correct address appeared on the attached affidavits as 
well as on the other warrants and corresponding affidavits, the 
defect was minimal." 
In the instant matter, on all available documents, including 
the affidavit for search warrant and the search warrant itself, 
the address to be searched was consistently specified as 3216 or 
3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City. From utility bills seized 
to show residency, a utility bill in the name of Gregg Taylor shows 
the address of the premises actually searched to be 3216 South 2040 
West, West Valley City. 
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The error here does not lie with the officer's unsureness as 
to whether it was 3216 or 3218 South, the significant error is that 
2040 West was searched when only 2050 West was authorized to be 
searched. Perhaps the most disturbing fact is the street sign 
showing 2040 West which stands directly in front of the actual 
premises which was searched. Since there appears to be no evidence 
that the incorrect address on the search warrant was a minor 
technical flaw, the logical conclusion is that the reliability of 
the officer swearing the affidavit is somewhat in (juestion, as well 
as the officer's suspicions of any particular residence. Had this 
factor been brought before the magistrate issuing the search 
warrant, it is questionable as to whether the reliability of the 
underlying statements would have sufficed for a finding of probable 
cause upon which said search warrant was issued. 
IV. EVIDENCE PRODUCED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF DISTRIBUTION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY. 
At trial of this matter in the district court, much evidence 
was introduced to the trier of fact. There was conflicting 
evidence as to who was in residency at the duplex which was 
searched. There was much evidence concerning the task force's 
controlled buys from Kevin and Kathy Gartrell. There was no 
credible evidence established that involved Defendant-Appellant in 
the sale of drugs, and as well the evidence conclusively failed to 
tie Defendant-Appellant to any drug transactions or possession. 
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Thus, the relevant issue, whether evidence produced at trial is 
insufficient so that reasonable minds could entertain a reasonable 
doubt that Defendant-Appellant was guilty of distribution of a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony? The evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the conviction. Utah Code Annotated, 58-
37-8(1), as amended; State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987). 
The unlawful act which Defendant-Appellant is accused, and 
convicted, of is distribution of a controlled substance, Utah Code 
Annotated, 58-37-8(1), as amended. This prohibited act presupposes 
that Defendant-Appellant distributed a controlled substance. No 
evidence was produced at trial to show distribution, or ancillary 
distributive activities, i.e., agreeing, consenting, offering, or 
arranging to distribute controlled substances. The only direct 
evidence offered at trial throughout the testimony of Witness Mori 
was that said witness observed a substance, which he believed to 
be cocaine, being cut and weighed. This witness also testified 
that he "didn't see him [Defendant-Appellant] actually give her 
[Kathy Gartrell] anything ... ." Record at 103, lines 20-22. Even 
allowing this witness the benefit of the doubt as to credibility 
before the trier of fact, and weighing all reasonable inference 
from evidence produced at the trial, the only possible prohibited 
act participated in by Defendant-Appellant was simple possession 
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
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Further on the issue of insufficiency of evidence, evidence 
produced at trial as to Defendant-Appellant's exclusive dominion 
of residency is inconclusive as to establishing nexus between him 
and illegal activity. Utah case law regarding sufficiency of 
evidence issues basically holds that mere suspicions or indications 
are insufficient nexus to tie an accused to an illegal activity. 
Especially in drug cases, the prosecution must establish that: 
[Controlled substances or other] contraband was found in 
a place or under circumstances indicating that the 
accused had the ability and the intent to exercise 
dominion and control over it. The mere occupancy of a 
portion of the premises where the drug is found cannot, 
without more, support a finding of its knowing and 
intentional possession by the accused. There must be 
some additional nexus between the accused and the 
contraband to show that the accused had th€* power and 
intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
(footnotes omitted). State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 
(Utah 1987). 
In the instant case, the prosecution failed to carry its 
burden of establishing nexus between Defendant-Appellant and 
dominion over the duplex residence in West Valley City. Evidence 
which was shown at trial indicates names of other people living at 
that address. In fact, such evidence shows others as being 
responsible for various utility and telephone Bills. Reasonable 
minds would necessarily have to entertain reasonable doubt that the 
evidence produced at trial conclusively points out that Defendant-
Appellant was connected with paraphernalia and contraband as was 
seized during the search. 
Thus, no additional nexus exists between the Defendant-
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Appellant and the contraband seized at the duplex to show he had 
any power or intent to exercise dominion and control over any such 
contraband. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, to wit: that the trial 
court abused its discretion in continuing, on its own motion, 
Defendant-Appellant1s Motion to Suppress until the morning shortly 
before trial; and because the law enforcement officers lacked 
probable cause upon which a search warrant could be issued making 
the search at 3216 or 3218 South 2040 West an illegal search; and 
further, because there was insufficient evidence upon which a 
reasonable juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
Defendant-Appellant guilty of second degree felony sales of 
cocaine. Defendant-Appellant respectfully requests that the lower 
court1s finding that the evidence obtained through the search 
warrant as admissible be reversed and that this case be remanded 
to the District Court, or in the alternative, be dismissed. 
DATED this flfi day of November, 1989. 
David Paul White 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties [Effective until July 
1, 1990]. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except under an order or prescrip-
tion; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order or directly from a practitioner while acting in the course 
of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place, 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by per-
sons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub-
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
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(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce .but less than 16 ounces, 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility 
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confine-
ment shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any con-
trolled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2)(b), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all 
other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or 
(iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through 
(2)(a)(vii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
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DIUMENTI & LINDSLEY 
William H. Lindsley #1966 
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorneys for Defendant 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: 292-0447 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY GARTRELL, 
Defendant. 
Comes now defendant, by and through counsel, and respectfully moves! 
the Court to suppress and exclude any and all evidence obtained pursuant tol 
the search of the premises located at 3216 South 2040 West, West Valley City J 
on the 30th day of March, 1988, pursuant to the Fourth, Fifth and Sixthj 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Rule 12 Utah Rules ofj 
Criminal Procedure and Article 1, Sections 7, 12 and 14 of the Constitution of! 
the State of Utah. This Motion is further based upon the following: I 
1 . That no lawful warrant was issued or served for the search! 
conducted upon premises which the defendant was an occupant of and/or entitled! 
to the use and possession of, located at 3216 South 2040 West, in Salt Lak^I 
County. J 
2. That any warrant the officers conducting the search had in theirl 
possession was, first, not for those specific premises, secondly, was! 
overbroad and vague, failing to describe with particularity the place to b I 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
AND NOTICE OF HEARING 
Case No. 
Judge Pat Brian 
searched or the things to be seized, and thirdly, that the issuance of such 
was not based upon probable casue. 
3. That the officers conducting the search were acting in bad faith 
and in wilful disregard for the provisions of Federal and State law providing 
for the protection of individual rights and security, and that particulary the 
officers sought a search warrant and included in an affidavit false or 
misleading facts which they knew to be false or misleading, and that the same 
officers concealed from the magistrate before whom they appeared relevant and 
material facts which they knew might result in the magistrate not issuing the 
warrant if such facts were known to the magistrate. 
For example, the affiant observed one Kathy Gartrell enter a separate 
residence wherein and about affiant observed another individual who affiant 
identified as a suspect in prior narcotics transactions, wherein it is 
probable the transactions complained of herein could have occurred (instead of 
the residence alleged by the prosection) which information was wilfully and 
deliberately withheld from the magistrate, 
WHEREFORE, defendant respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing 
relative to this motion and an opportunity thereafter to submit legal argument 
on facts then presented, and that all evidence obtained thereby be excluded 
and suppressed* J 
Dated this / ^ day of January, 1989. 
William 
Attorney for Defendant 
n. Lindslev 
NOTICE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that hearing attendant defendant's Motion his 
been scheduled on Friday, January 20, 1989 at the hour of 1:30 p.m. or as soon 
thereafter as counsel may be heard before the Honorable Pat Brian. 
Dated this / J day of January, 1989. 
William H. Lindsley 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing this j Q day 
of January, 1989, to Steve Majors, Deputy Davis County Attorney, Courthouse, 
Farmington, Utah 8*1025. 
APPENDIX C 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 4 51-3 2 27 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
apartment located in a 
duplex described as the 
East unit of the duplex 
with an address of either 
3216 or 3218 South 2050 
West, West Valley City and 
occupied by Troy Gartrell 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before (, Circuit Court Judge, the 
undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has 
probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
apartment located in a 
duplex described as the 
East unit of the duplex 
with an address of either 
3216 or 3218 South 2050 
West West Valley City and 
occupied by Troy Gartrell 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled Substances 
Drug Paraphernalia 
Records, accounts, books, pictures receipts or 
other written material evidencing sales or 
distribution of controlled substances 
Monies, securities, currency or other items of 
value used in the sale or distribution of 
controlled substances 
Identification cards, records, accounts books, 
pictures, receipts, personal property or other 
items evidencing ownership, occupation or 
control of the above premises or rooms therein. 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are 
as follows: 
1. That affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro 
Narcotic Task Force and is familiar with the facts presented 
herein. 
2. That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988, 
affiant made contact with Confidential Informant at which 
time, the Confidential Informant made a phone call to Kevin and 
Cathey Gartrell at their home in Farmington. 
3. That at that time, Confidential Informant made 
arrangements with Kevin and Cathey to purchase 1/4 ounce of 
Cocaine such arrangements being that Confidential Informant would 
deliver the money to Cathey Gartrell on the following day, and 
she would then run to the home of her dealer, pick up the 
cocaine and return it to Confidential Informant. 
4. That said conversation was recorded and monitored 
by affiant. 
5. That on the 30th day of March, 1988, under the 
supervision of affiant, Confidential Informant did then deliver a 
sum of money to Cathey Gartrell as had been arranged. 
6. That at the time the Confidential Informant gave 
Cathey Gartrell the money, Confidential Informant requested that 
she call Confidential Informant before she left her dealers home 
and let Confidential Informant know whether she had obtained the 
cocaine or not. 
7. That after the money was delivered, affiant and Paul 
Rapp then followed the automobile driven by Cathey Gartrell into 
the Salt Lake area. 
8. That affiant observed Cathey Gartrell drive directly 
to a duplex located at 3218 South 2050 West, West Valley City, 
Utah and that affiant was able to observe her the whole way and 
the only stop she made was at a gas station in Farmington, Utah 
where she filled her car with gas. 
9. That upon arriving at the above address, affiant 
observed Cathey's vehicle parked in the driveway of the above 
described duplex and that this was 12:55 p.m. 
10. Statement from Officer Llyod Killpack that at 1:29 
p.m. he monitored a phone call from Cathey 
Gartrell to the Confidential Informant in which Cathey indicated 
that she had obtained the cocaine and that she was on the way 
back to deliver it to Confidential Informant. 
11. That at 1:56 p.m. affiant observed Cathey Gartrell 
leave the east unit of the above described duplex and place a red 
bag in the trunk of her car, and then enter her vehicle. 
12. That affiant was unable to obtain the exact number 
of the east unit but was able to observe that one unit was 
number 3218 and one 3216. 
13. Statement from Officer Paul Rapp, that after Cathey 
Gartrell entered her vehicle she then left the area and he 
was again able to follow her directly back to her home in 
Farmington without making any stops. 
14. Statement from Officer Lloyd Killpack that he was 
maintaining survallence of Cathey Gartrell's home and observe^ 
her arrive at the home at which time she met briefly with a male 
individual at which time she got back into her vehicle and left. 
15. Statement from Paul Rapp that he observed Cathey 
Gartrell leave her home in Farmington and after stopping for a 
short time in the parking lot of the Davis County Municipal Court 
Building enter the 1-15 freeway heading south. 
18. That at that time, Cathey Gartrell's vehicle was 
stopped in the area of Centerville and she was placed under 
arrest. 
19. That a search of her vehicle was made incident to 
arrest at which time a red bag was found in the trunk of her car 
which- contained a set of scales and a baggie containing about 1/4 
ounce of white powder which based on affiant experience and 
training is believed to be cocaine. 
20. That also located in the vehicle was a large 
quantity of marijuana. 
21. That after Cathey Gartrell was placed under arrest 
she was advised of her miranda rights which she waived and 
thereupon spoke with affiant. 
22. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above-described premises and the seizure of 
any of the said items. 
Affian^/' zii* ' 
Subscribed and sworn to me 1988. 
r 
APPENDIX D 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 4 51-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
rHE STATE OF UTAH, : 
• 
En Re: Search of an SEARCH WARRANT 
ipartment located in a 
luplex described as the : 
Cast unit of the duplex 
/ith an address of either : 
1216 or 3218 South 2050 
/est West Valley City and : 
>ccupied by Troy Gartrell 
:OUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
TATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
HE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE COUNTY OF DAVIS: 
Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by 
on Brian investigator with the Davis Narcotic Task Force, that 
e has reason to believe that in the below-described premises 
here are items which constitute evidence of the commission of a 
rime. 
YOU ARE THERE* : COMMANDED in the daytime or the night 
ime with out giving notice of your presence or intentions, to 
*ke immediate search of the premises described as: 
apartment located in a 
duplex described as the 
East unit of the duplex 
with an address of either: 
3216 or 3218 South 2050 
West West Valley City and: 
occupied by Troy Gartrell 
and search for the following property: 
Controlled Substances 
Drug Paraphernalia 
Records, accounts, books, pictures receipts or 
other written material evidencing sales or 
distribution of controlled substances 
Monies, securities, currency or other items of 
value used in the sale or distribution of 
controlled substances 
Identification cards, records, accounts books, 
pictures, receipta^personal property or other 
items evidencingrJ^wnFT^Hip9 occupation or 
control of the ab«w-ppwnises or rooms therein. 
\nd if you find the same or any part thereof to bring it 
forthwith before me at the Circuit Court, County of Davis, or 
retain such property in your custody subject to the order of this 
:ourt. 
Given under my hand and dated this day of 
•tf*L. 1988. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered a true and 
correct copy of Appellants Brief, to the following: 
Dan Larsen 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
this i(jp day of November, 1989. 
David Paul White 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
